Security and stability in Northern Africa

September 22, 2016 - nr.101
Summary

Summary, conclusions and recommendations

Summary and conclusions

Today the fate of Europe is tied to that of Africa more than ever before. In this report, the AIV focuses on the countries of North Africa, the Sahel, West Africa and the Horn of Africa, and especially on Mali and Libya. It uses the term ‘Northern Africa’ to refer to this region. Joint solutions have to be found for the enormous problems the region faces.

The prospects for Northern Africa are sombre and the security and stability of Europe – and therefore of the Netherlands – are directly threatened by the security risks prevalent in this part of Africa. These include terrorism and religious extremism, drugs and people smuggling, weapons proliferation and large-scale migration flows. The AIV assumes that these security risks will persist in the short and medium term and that the prospects for the long term are also unfavourable. Climate change and high population growth in Africa – prognoses suggest an increase of 1.2 billion people to a total of 4.4 billion by 2100 – are structural factors that help exacerbate the situation. Climate change is leading to desertification and water scarcity, with results including falling food production, increasing refugee flows and rising tensions. The substantial rise in population in Africa is not being paralleled by strong economic development, making migration from Africa to Europe not a temporary phenomenon but an issue that Europe will have to address permanently and to an increasing extent.

Where North Africa was formerly a buffer zone for the European continent, since 2011 it has become a source of instability. The chain of authoritarian states in the region has disappeared, and the situation is now highly differentiated, with a new authoritarian regime in Egypt, moderately authoritarian regimes in Algeria and Morocco, chaos in Libya, and a moderately positive situation in Tunisia. In addition, the problems of terrorism, uncontrolled migration and organised transnational crime have become much more severe. Partly as a consequence of shifting power relations in the Middle East, more and more Arab countries – including the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia and Qatar – as well as Turkey are showing an interest in Northern Africa and are trying to extend their influence in the region. The consequences of the Arab Spring are being felt in the adjoining regions of the Sahel, West Africa and the Horn of Africa, where there are many fragile states.

Europe finds itself in a new constellation. In recent decades, the EU’s political position and influence in Africa have weakened considerably. The EU needs Northern Africa at least as much as Northern Africa needs Europe, and that calls for new, more equal relations. Furthermore, the EU has never been and is still not the only significant actor there. The UN plays a crucial role, alongside the AU and regional organisations like ECOWAS and the recently established G5 Sahel. Individual countries like the Arab states, the US, France, the UK, Italy and China are also active in the region.

Security problems
Terrorism, cross-border crime and migration are not new phenomena in Northern Africa but, as a result of the current instability in the region, they have grown explosively and are causing serious problems. The security situation in the various countries is complex and conflicts are therefore increasingly diffuse in nature. There are of course considerable differences between the different countries and regions, but they share a number of common features. Armed conflict not only arises from political disagreement, but is also driven by criminal motives, extremist ideologies and violent militias. The number of rebel movements, militias and terrorist organisations is increasing. There is a clear link between the security problems in North Africa and the Sahel and it is therefore important to consider them together in a cross-regional approach.

Islamic extremism is spreading in Northern Africa, and the presence of weak states is an important reason for the advance of jihadism in Africa as a whole. Jihadist movements are gaining footholds mainly where central government does not control the whole country and people in peripheral areas lack security and public services. Local and regional conflicts create a fertile breeding ground for the emergence of extremist movements, and these movements in turn are a cause of conflict. Jihadist movements are highly appealing to young people who are politically, socially and economically marginalised and are wrestling with their identities. The influence of radical Islamic groups in Africa makes the continent vulnerable to the influence of IS, as can be seen from the current situation in Libya.

Most countries in Northern Africa are having to deal with organised crime, people smuggling and trafficking in humans, arms and drugs. The Sahel has traditionally been a major transit region. Long-running conflicts and the fall of Gaddafi, who exercised control over a large proportion of the criminal networks in the region, have led to an enormous increase in illegal trade through the Sahel. There are close ties between criminal and terrorist groups. The chaos in Libya and the lack of border controls has made the country the perfect hub for transnational criminal networks. Existing smuggling routes are used intensively and the south of the country in particular is a haven for smugglers of arms, drugs and migrants. Refugees and migrants from Africa come from conflict areas like Eritrea, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia, and others – including Nigeria, Senegal and Gambia – which they are more likely to leave for economic reasons.

War, conflict, poor governance, environmental degradation and declining prospects for local food production, as well as systematic violations of human rights, are the main causes of the high numbers of refugees. Other major reasons are weak regional economies and chronic poverty. Europe is also attractive to well-educated young people because it offers better prospects for the future. Routes for migration, people smuggling and human trafficking have passed through Africa for centuries. The number of people being transported along these routes has risen considerably in recent years because of the increasing instability in North Africa. The region has developed close ties with criminal and terrorist networks. Libya and Egypt are the main points of departure for refugees and migrants. In 2015, 150,000 people made the crossing to Europe. Along the way, they are exposed to robbery and forced labour. Thousands drown in the Mediterranean Sea. These are shameful conditions to which the international community cannot close its eyes.

International actors
Many international organisations, including the UN, the EU, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Arab League and, to a lesser extent, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as individual countries, concern themselves with peace and security in Africa. Africa also has a number of organisations active in this area, including the African Union (AU) and the regional economic communities (SADC, ECCAS, ECOWAS and IGAD). It is a patchwork of organisations that sometimes work together and sometimes work at cross purposes. The AIV attaches the greatest importance to better coordination and more effective cooperation between the various international organisations. In Somalia, for example, IGAD, the East African Community, the Arab League, the AU, the UN, the EU, individual countries in the region and bilateral donors are all active, each with their own approach. This leads to situations like checkpoints with Somali troops dressed in five different uniforms, trained by different countries with different doctrines – an exceptionally undesirable situation.

The international community has a tendency to respond when a crisis erupts and then withdraw again once the worst is over. The intervention in Libya in 2011 is a good example. The current situation in the country shows the disastrous consequences of such short-sighted policy. It is therefore important to identify crises at a much earlier stage and take prompt action. The EU Conflict Early Warning System is a useful instrument for this purpose1 Knowledge and information from NGOs are also indispensable. It is easier for the EU to take action than the UN, where there is always the risk of a stalemate in the Security Council. There is a close link between fast security (political and/or military intervention) and slow security (structural measures to promote stability, such as stimulating economic growth). There are situations in which fast security is required, but ideally it should be preceded and followed by slow security measures. In the AIV’s opinion, when designing missions, it is especially important to bear in mind the long term: the mission’s political aim, its various phases, capacity building in the long term (‘train the trainers’) and the desired end state. An early civil assessment, including a very thorough analysis of social and cultural factors, is particularly essential. Because of the cross-border nature of security problems, it may be necessary to give a mission a regional basis. The availability of military materiel and enablers like strategic transport and medical support often proves to be an obstacle. That calls for specific investments. For a sustainable result, it may be necessary to persist with a mission for a longer period.

The countries of Northern Africa are Europe’s close neighbours. The two regions have close ties as a result of their shared colonial past. The EU has a wide range of instruments at its disposal, ranging from trade to crisis management missions, and would be well advised to transform its largely defensive approach into a constructive agenda of dialogue, aid and cooperation. Security, development and political reform (governance) should be integral parts of such an agenda. Given the rising tensions in the region, the AIV believes that the EU should make the promotion of security and stability in Northern Africa a main priority of its policy, with a special focus on the Sahel countries, because of the region’s key position. This focus on stability must, however, not lead to other issues being removed from the agenda. The EU could place its relations with Northern Africa within the general framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean, which emerged from the Barcelona Process. The existing individual Mediterranean Partnerships also offer the scope to take account of countries’ diverse characteristics and ambitions. The AIV does, however, have a critical comment on the way in which the EU deploys its wide range of civil, military and Community instruments, alongside the activities of individual EU member states. There are so many programmes, bodies and activities that a coordinated approach is impossible from the outset, which undermines the EU’s effectiveness. The effectiveness of some of the instruments can also be questioned. The AIV considers it crucial for EU institutions and individual member states to make a greater effort to increase the effectiveness of European programmes in Northern Africa.

The security risks on Europe’s eastern flank require attention too, of course, but these are in the first instance NATO’s responsibility. On the southern flank, it is up to the EU to play a leading role. That calls for structural improvements in coordination between EU bodies and between these bodies and member states. There are benefits to be gained in Brussels from better streamlining and coordination of EU instruments. EU bodies and Delegations, member states’ embassies and NGOs could work more closely together in the field. Given the instruments at its disposal, the EU is best equipped to contribute to slow security, while the member states are better placed to focus on fast security because they have the necessary resources, including intelligence and military materiel. For that reason, the AIV feels that the EU should focus more on training missions, leaving more classical crisis management operations to be led by member states, especially the larger ones, in coalitions of the willing. The AIV expects NATO to continue to play a limited role in North Africa in the future.

The refugee and migration issue has a prominent place in the EU’s internal and external policies. The EU has taken measures, including through the Frontex Operation Triton and EUNAVFOR Med/Sophia, to improve security on its external borders, combat people smuggling and save people from drowning. In the AIV’s opinion, establishing a European border and coastguard and a European asylum system (including a humane refugee policy and the possibility of legal migration) are necessary measures. The agreements made at the Valletta Summit and the establishment of the EU Trust Fund, which explicitly focus on preventing large-scale migration flows, are a good starting point for a sustainable partnership between the EU and the countries of the region. The amount set aside for the EU Trust Fund, €1.3 billion for 23 countries, is however on the low side, certainly compared to the €6 billion for Turkey. One major concern is the way in which countries like Eritrea, which is suspected of being involved in human trafficking, comply with the EU’s agreements with African governments to limit migration. The question is whether the financial support pledged by the EU will genuinely lead to a reduction in migration and refugee flows.

The EU has concluded mobility partnerships with a number of countries, including Morocco and Tunisia, which aim to prevent illegal migration and facilitate legal migration. Similar partnerships could be agreed with other countries in Northern Africa. Lessons could also be learned from the recent agreements between Spain and Morocco and between the US and Mexico. After a history of unilateral border controls and closure, these countries have made more wide-ranging agreements to manage their shared borders better and more humanely. The core of these agreements is that closing strategic parts of the borders is not enough and that there should be regulated routes for asylum seekers and migrants. People seeking asylum in Spain, for example, can apply in the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla and there are legal migration channels for, for example, seasonal workers and students.2

The UN and its crisis management operations play an indispensable role in Northern Africa. The AIV supports the AU’s ambition to take responsibility for security and stability on the continent in the long term, but that is not yet possible as the AU still needs to overcome serious shortages of materiel and trained troops. The AIV considers it important for European countries to continue to contribute to UN operations so as to raise them to a qualitatively higher level. Dutch participation in MINUSMA since 2014 marks the end of a period in which the Netherlands did not take part in large-scale UN operations in Africa. In the AIV’s opinion, the Netherlands should continue to invest in UN operations in the region, partly because the AU cannot yet play its desired prominent role. If an international mission is to be sent to Libya, the Netherlands should consider taking part.

The Netherlands
In light of the serious and complex problems in Northern Africa, the AIV advises the Dutch government to focus its policy on promoting stable, peaceful development in the region. It is important to acknowledge that furthering electoral democratisation, economic progress, peace and security, the rule of law and other desirable policy goals simultaneously is often not feasible in practice. So many problems need to be addressed at the same time, mostly with modest resources, that it is better to focus on achieving feasible results one step at a time and in pragmatic order.3

In making these pragmatic choices, Dutch policy could be guided by the principle that it should contribute as concretely as possible to improving the mostly very difficult daily lives of the people of these countries. That means prioritising a policy that strengthens their security, fosters a stable society, promotes employment, gradually reinforces the rule of law, and helps make progress on the position of women and gender issues in general. A one-sided focus on electoral democratisation has had disappointing results in a number of countries. Democratic, participatory governance requires much more, including the development of a middle class, independent trade unions, education, free media, a balanced system of political parties, institutions that can safeguard constitutional rights and a pluriform system of checks and balances to curb the tendency of social elites to abuse their power. Because of the cultural and ethnic composition of African societies, this will have to take a different form than in Western Europe. The fact that electoral democratisation is not a precondition for cooperation does not mean that we can continue to be involved in a country if its government pursues a policy of severe and widespread repression and lawlessness.

A results-oriented policy must not be based on general goals and policy formulas that apply to all countries. The reality of the country itself, its history, its political, cultural and economic situation and other factors that differ in each country also affect the feasibility of policy. This means that the Dutch government must consider the nature of its partnership with each country individually. Similarly, it has to strike a balance between measures that help improve security in the short term (fast security) and policy aimed at addressing structural issues in the long term (slow security). It will also have to decide which bodies in each country it can or cannot work with. This inevitably requires a certain degree of pragmatism, as well as awareness that the central government is not always necessarily the first or only choice of cooperation partner in a country. A policy that tries to achieve a little of everything and can be applied consistently to all societies may seem attractive in an abstract sense for policy discussions in the donor country but there is a serious risk of achieving little improvement on balance or even being counterproductive due to a lack of focus and prioritisation.

In addition, Dutch policy is only a small part of a wide range of policies pursued by many other actors. This means that the best results will be achieved by concentrating on areas where the Netherlands is relatively strong, such as the agrarian sector (including water management) and sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR), including gender issues and gender-related healthcare. It is also advisable to support efforts to promote the gradual development of the rule of law (including support for police and military security organisations) in countries with governments that are amenable to such support.

The direct and immediate effects of insecurity and instability in Northern Africa for the Netherlands seem foreseeable for the time being. As yet, there are no indications of foreign terrorist fighters returning to the country from the region. Nor is there a large influx of refugees or migrants from Africa (with the exception of Eritrea). The Netherlands is, however, a major destination for drugs smuggled from Africa. Northern Africa is currently not a priority area in Dutch foreign, security and development policy, with the exception of the Horn of Africa and Mali. Dutch economic interests in the region are relatively small. This situation can change, however, so that the consequences for the EU and thus also for the Netherlands can increase in the longer term. As an EU member state, the Netherlands must take account of the risks for the EU in Northern Africa and cannot neglect its responsibilities.

The Dutch government has not published a policy document on Africa since 2003. The AIV believes it is important for a new integrated strategy on Northern Africa to be developed. Given its comparative advantages, it is logical for the Netherlands to focus on slow security. Migration has become an important focus area in Dutch foreign policy and receives a great deal of attention from both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation. The Netherlands contributes to both bilateral and multilateral initiatives on migration. Within these initiatives, it strives to work with African countries and invest in employment for young people. The AIV encourages the government to tackle underlying causes. Africa’s rapid population growth requires paying attention to the complete range of human rights described in the Vienna Declaration. Serious deficits in the observance of fundamental rights to education, healthcare and economic development severely exacerbate the problems described in this report, and it is essential to address these negative developments in the preventive approach that the AIV considers necessary in Northern Africa.

Because of the importance of sharing risks, even smaller countries like the Netherlands must be prepared to make a proportional contribution to fast security. The AIV has observed a striking tendency in the Netherlands to view French military activities in Africa with suspicion, as though France were acting purely in its own interests. The AIV believes that this is a misconception given that France’s military operations in Africa, as shown by its crucial intervention in Mali, are of great value to the EU and Northern Africa and therefore deserve appreciation and support.

Any deployment of the armed forces in Northern Africa must depend on reasonable chances of success. Military support for countries with a manifestly heinous regime that uses its armed forces only to safeguard its own interests is counterproductive. Dutch involvement in a unilateral operation can also be a problem if the people of the country see it as only serving the interests of the country conducting it.

The Dutch armed forces have the highly trained personnel and materiel capabilities to contribute to security sector reform (SSR) and strengthen regional crisis management capacity to undertake, for example, counterterrorist, anti-piracy and border control activities. In the coming period, they will most probably be more active in Northern Africa, in order to prepare Dutch units for deployment through training and exercises and engage in operational cooperation with partner countries. Besides the broad terrain of SSR, specific focuses in deploying Dutch armed forces are the use of special forces, counter-IED, gender, coastguard capacity building, border control and intelligence.

Given the increasing importance of all three of the main tasks of the Dutch armed forces and these forces’ considerable shortcomings, the deployment of Dutch military units in Northern Africa in the coming period will continually have to compete with the deployment of units elsewhere and with readiness instruction and training programmes. The deployment of enablers like logistical end engineering support, transport helicopters and intelligence capacity – for which there is great demand on the African continent – jeopardises the Dutch armed forces’ readiness, in as much as joint training and exercises with African armed forces does not itself bolster that readiness.

The focus in deploying the Dutch armed forces will have to lie on participation in UN and EU missions and support for the AU’s regional security organisations. In providing this support, the absorption capacity of the countries and/or security organisations should be taken into account. In addition, these countries and security organisations should be amenable to support. Some countries do not welcome large-scale military intervention, despite the problems they face.

The AIV expects the armed forces to be called upon more in coming decades to address the security threats from Northern Africa. This will substantially increase the pressure on a defence budget that is already far too low. The armed forces are already performing tasks for which no adequate funding has been provided, at the expense of investment and other necessary budget items. Additional financial resources need to be allocated to enhance the Netherlands’ focus on its integrated security and stability policy on Northern Africa. Partly in light of this urgent need for funds, the AIV repeats its earlier plea for the defence budget to be substantially increased.4

Recommendations

The AIV is of the opinion that many necessary programmes and activities aimed at Northern Africa can best be conducted by or through the EU. For that reason, before presenting its recommendations for the Netherlands, it will make a number of recommendations relating to the EU and the Netherlands’ role within it.

European Union

  1. The EU member states should make promoting stability and security – and human security in particular – in Northern Africa one of the main aims of European foreign and security policy in the coming period, together with responsible economic development, political reform and respect for universal human rights.
     
  2. The AIV considers it necessary that, when cooperating with groups and governments in Northern Africa, the EU bear in mind the specific situation in the various countries and be guided by pragmatism, exploring where there is room for improvement and what contribution it can make in each individual situation. This does not change the fact that financial and other support for regimes that violate human rights on a large scale should only be provided under strict conditions.
     
  3. The AIV believes that EU member states and institutions should make every effort to optimise coordination and cooperation on Northern Africa. To that end, member states should coordinate and channel their programmes and financial contributions to Northern Africa as much as possible through the EU. The EU itself should take steps to remove the barriers between the various categories of expenditure – especially between the EEAS and the European Commission. It will also have to be more flexible in implementing programmes so that resources are allocated in the most effective way. In addition, cooperation between the various EU institutions and Delegations, member states’ embassies and EU experts can be improved.
     
  4. The AIV considers it necessary that greater attention be paid prior to the start of a CSDP mission to the setup of the mission, including a timely and thorough civil assessment, study of the units the Netherlands will be working with, a follow-up programme (‘train the trainers’) and a clear idea of the desired end state. Given the cross-border nature of the security problems in Northern Africa, regionalising CSDP missions is advisable.
     
  5. The EU should invest in training and instructing AU military units in the future, so that in the long term they can take responsibility for security and stability themselves. It should also provide basic training in the norms of international law and respect for human rights. This could include AU units attending and participating in EU Battlegroup training activities and exercises.
     
  6. EU member states should step up their police and intelligence cooperation on combating terrorism and crime. The EU should also be given greater counterterrorism powers so that it can be more effective both internally and externally. The possibilities should be explored for improved police and justice cooperation between the EU and African countries, so as to better combat international crime, including human trafficking and people smuggling.
     
  7. In the AIV’s opinion, EU member states should explore the possibility of joint acquisition of enablers such as strategic transport and medical support, which are in great demand in crisis management operations and in the affected countries. They should also investigate how the EU could finance such investments.
     
  8. The AIV believes that, if a government of national unity in Libya appeals for help from the international community, the Netherlands should consider contributing to a civil or military mission. In cooperation with foreign oil companies, a start could be made on resuming oil production, as long as supporters of the former Gaddafi regime and terrorist groups do not benefit. Unfreezing financial assets could also be considered, under the same conditions. This would enable Libya’s economic development to recover. In addition, if the situation in Libya allowed it, the EU could provide assistance in reconstructing the country’s armed forces.
     
  9. The EU should develop a humane and fully harmonised European asylum and migration policy.5 Together with the UN, it could fund the building and management of efficient refugee centres in the regions, from where the member states could set up routes for asylum and migration to the EU, regulated in close consultation. The instruments for joint European border control and migration regulation need to be energetically improved. Member states should provide sufficient resources, people and funds and be prepared to exercise their sovereignty jointly.
     
  10. The EU will have to make a robust contribution to the sustainable protection of refugees in countries in the region. It must not only ensure their physical safety – protecting them from persecution and violence – but also to offer them future prospects in the host country through work and education. Seaports, airports and other locations will have to be designated on the EU’s external borders with adequate provision for receiving and screening refugees and migrants. European support for the member states concerned, through the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and Frontex, will be required to ensure these hot spots operate effectively. European information campaigns in third countries must make it clear that people who want to migrate to the European Union without prior permission from a member state will have to report to one of these specially designated transit ports.6

The Netherlands

  1. The AIV advises the government to draw up a strategy document on Northern Africa, with an enhanced policy focus on counterterrorism, religious extremism, cross-border crime, uncontrolled migration and promoting employment. These issues are a part of both internal and external policy and therefore require a government-wide, integrated approach for the short, medium and long terms. The role of preventive measures should be given a prominent role in the strategy document. The AIV advises the government to devote considerably more financial resources to Northern Africa, both for the enhanced policy focus on integrated security and stability policy and for development cooperation, specifically in the areas of education, healthcare and economic development. In addition, the number of embassies and military attaches in Northern Africa should be increased, and their staff expanded.
     
  2. Because of the scale and complexity of the problems in Northern Africa, Dutch development policy needs to be modified. The emphasis should lie even more on the region, and the Sahel in particular, with special attention to regional cooperation, capacity building, structural economic development and employment for young people. The AIV considers it advisable to develop a multi-year strategic plan for future Dutch programmes in the Sahel.
     
  3. In discussions on Association Agreements, the Netherlands should press in the EU for further lowering of all European trade barriers to the import of agricultural and industrial products and services from Northern Africa.
     
  4. The AIV advises the government to continue to contribute to improving infrastructure in Northern Africa. Large multilateral development banks and the European Investment Bank can play a prominent role in this respect. In addition, the Netherlands should continue to work on developing new technologies for agriculture, horticulture and efficient water use.
     
  5. To promote balanced demographic development and increase women’s autonomy, the AIV considers it necessary for the government to continue to give priority to promoting SRHR, especially in Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mali, Niger and Nigeria.7
     
  6. The AIV recommends that Dutch military interventions in Africa, alongside defence activities elsewhere on the continent, should focus more than previously on Northern Africa. That includes posting defence attaches and gathering intelligence. Because of the armed forces’ limited , this will require extra investments that are part of the substantial increase in the defence budget that the AIV has called for earlier.
     
  7. The AIV believes that the Dutch armed forces have the highly trained personnel and materiel capabilities to contribute to security sector reform (SSR) and strengthen regional crisis management capacity to undertake, for example, counterterrorist, antipiracy and border control activities. In the years ahead, they could also be more active in Northern Africa in preparing Dutch units for deployment through training and exercises and engaging in operational cooperation with partner countries. Besides the broad terrain of SSR, focuses in deploying Dutch armed forces are the use of special forces, counter-IED, gender, coastguard capacity building, border control and intelligence.
     
  8. Because of the increased importance of SSR missions and the great demand this generates for experienced officers and NCOs of operational units involved in readiness programmes, the AIV recommends setting up (and financing) a separate armed forceswide unit with a rotating pool of experienced officers and NCOs to be deployed for SSR. This would mean creating more room in the Ministry of Defence staff establishment. It is also important to ensure that the officers have sufficient command of the relevant languages (besides English, also French in particular) and knowledge of the local culture.
     
  9. Although the AIV believes that there is great demand for enablers like transport helicopters, engineering support and intelligence capabilities on the African continent, these are also indispensable in readiness programmes for all the main tasks of the Dutch armed forces. Given actual and potential commitments elsewhere, it will always be necessary to consider whether a contribution with such niche capabilities is responsible and for how long.
     
  10. In the case of new missions in countries of origin or transit, it is advisable to include migration as a focus area in the mission’s mandate. The Netherlands could contribute to such missions by supplying migration experts from Border Security Teams or elsewhere. In the case of current missions, it is important to consider carefully whether the mandate can be modified and when, and whether more attention can be paid to migration issues.

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1 See: <http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/conflict_prevention/docs/201409_factsheet_conflict_earth_ warning_en.pdf>.
2 The same idea underlies the current talks between the US, the UN and a number of Latin American countries on building refugee centres in countries like El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, where UN officials will decide which asylum seekers qualify for refugee status. The US would then be willing to resettle 9,000 of these people per year. For lessons to be learned from the management of American borders, see Cyrille Fijnaut, ‘Pleidooi voor de vorming van een Schengen II: Versterking van de controle aan de buitengrenzen and van de politiële and justitiële samenwerking binnen de Europese Unie’, in Frans Bieckmann and Monika Sie Dhian Ho, De belofte van een ander Europa, Amsterdam: Van Gennep, forthcoming in 2016.
3 See: AIV advisory report no. 91, ‘The Netherlands and the Arab Region: A Principled and Pragmatic Approach’, The Hague, November 2014.
4 See also AIV advisory report no. 94 ‘Instability around Europe: Confrontation with a new reality’, The Hague, April 2015.
5 See also AIV advisory letter no. 28, ‘The Future of Schengen’, The Hague, March 2016.
6 See also Cyrille Fijnaut, ‘Pleidooi voor de vorming van een Schengen II’.
7 SRHR is one of the four priority themes of Dutch development policy (together with security and the rule of law, water and food security). The policy devotes attention to the following topics: sex education and services relating to sexuality for young people; better access to contraception, anti-retroviral drugs for AIDS and other medicines; SRHR as part of accessible and affordable basic healthcare; more respect for the sexual health and rights of victims of discrimination and vulnerable groups, including gay men, drug users, prostitutes and child brides.
Advice request

Professor Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
Chairman of the Advisory Council
on International Affairs
P.O. Box 20061
2500 EB The Hague

Date    26 May 2015
Re       Request for advice on security and Africa

Dear Professor De Hoop Scheffer,

Africa’s position on the world stage has changed dramatically. The increased standard of living in and growing self-confidence of many African countries create prospects of an expanded relationship with the continent. Of course, there are still countries and regions which confirm traditional stereotypes of poverty, poor governance and violent conflict. In many other places, though, impressive economic growth figures are giving rise to new prospects, which can contribute to stability, sustainable development and human dignity, and which must therefore be consolidated wherever possible.

The variety of relationships with Africa is increasing dramatically, and this calls for a comprehensive approach. The Netherlands is interested in working with Africa where we have common interests, such as regional stability, trade, migration, climate change and security.

The security situation remains troubling in many areas. The policy letter ‘Turbulent Times in Unstable Surroundings’ describes North Africa and parts of Sub-Saharan and West Africa as elements of an arc of growing instability and conflict around Europe. More specifically, the letter notes a deterioration in the security situation in northern Mali and Libya. This also applies to South Sudan. Although Somalia is becoming politically more stable, violence still flares up there on a regular basis. In addition, the Ebola epidemic in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone shows how shortcomings in states’ ability to respond swiftly and adequately can have economic, political and social repercussions. Finally, migrant flows from the continent are only expected to further increase, partly as a result of demographic developments. Many young people in African countries see no hope for the future and instead choose to make the perilous crossing to Europe.

At the same time Africa offers opportunities. The availability of natural resources, cheap young labour and targeted foreign investment have led to progress. Over the past 10 years many African countries have developed into fully fledged economic and political actors with the confidence to make their own choices and the willingness to take responsibility for promoting security and stability in their own regions. Global economic and political power relations are in flux, leading to a different dynamic on the continent. The Netherlands and other European countries have to respond to this new reality, one of significant sub-regional differences, with clusters of instability and fragility interspersed with growth centres.

The government believes that any choices made by the Netherlands in its dealings with Africa, whether unilaterally or multilaterally, should be informed by certain principles. First of all, these choices should be the outcome of a clear assessment of the various interests at play. In this way the government seeks to foster public support for Dutch foreign and security policy. Africa’s relevance to the Netherlands’ security is obvious, but our exact level of engagement in terms of policy merits closer examination.

Secondly, in the policy letter mentioned above, the government concluded that the nature of conflicts in North and Sub-Saharan Africa demand an integrated and targeted approach in the framework of either the EU or UN. The Netherlands is already active in a number of missions in Africa: it provides a substantial contribution to the UN mission in Mali, participates in the UN mission in South Sudan, supplies both military capabilities and expertise for the training and instruction of African armed forces in multilateral and bilateral settings, and also makes port visits in order to cement relationships. These examples are indicative of an integrated approach whereby analyses and assessments are informed by development interests and efforts. A military operation is not carried out in isolation, but in tandem with other foreign policy instruments. This approach has been described at length in previous policy documents and parliamentary papers, and it remains our point of departure in such situations.

Within these frameworks the government feels a need for a more detailed analysis of what Dutch interests are at stake in Africa, what opportunities and threats have arisen in the new security context, and what responses make the most sense. A detailed overview of this multifaceted continent will enable the government to make more informed choices with regard to Africa. The advisory report should shed light on the role of and deployment opportunities for the armed forces in relation to other Dutch policy tools (development cooperation, diplomacy, and economic missions). The government asks the AIV to draw up an advisory report that addresses the following questions:

  • What Dutch security and other interests are being affected by developments on the African continent?
     
  • The policy letter ‘Turbulent Times’ makes the point that ‘fast security’ should be coupled with ‘slow security’, aimed at finding an enduring solution to a crisis. With a view to the various interests at stake, what parts of Africa are suitable for a multi-year, structural approach to the underlying causes of instability?
     
  • What changes does the AIV see in EU member states’ willingness and ability to promote security, stability and development on the African continent in an EU or UN framework (or in some other framework), including through the commitment of military capabilities?
     
  • What developments does the AIV see in regional organisations like the African Union and ECOWAS with respect to security issues, and what opportunities for cooperation does this create for the Netherlands?
     
  • The Dutch armed forces must be able to respond swiftly and carry out and sustain a range of missions in different areas simultaneously on a sufficient scale. What role should the armed forces play in protecting the various interests at stake on the African continent? What factors are most relevant when assessing the possibility of a military commitment?

This request for advice is provided for in the work programme for 2014. We look forward to receiving the AIV’s recommendations.

Yours sincerely,

Bert Koenders
Minister of Foreign Affairs    

Lilianne Ploumen
Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation

Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert
Minister of Defence

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