Society and the armed forces

July 13, 2006 - nr.48
Summary

Conclusions and recommendations

 

Mobilising public support for specific military operations (see chapter I)

Public support for the armed forces is defined in this advisory report as the view of the Dutch population (or a majority of them) that the armed forces are necessary or indispensable. Public support for the armed forces is divided into three categories in this report:

1. Public support for the armed forces in general, i.e. the necessity and desirability of having armed forces.

2. Public support for the various tasks of the armed forces such as national defence and contributions to international peace and security.

3. Public support for specific military operations. A further distinction can be made in this case between the degree of support before, during and after an operation.

 

Research shows that there is ample public support in the first two categories. The problem mainly concerns the third category – support for specific operations. Here public support is not always certain in advance. In its general consideration of the subject of society and the armed forces in chapter I, the AIV therefore deals primarily with the question of what factors determine public support for specific operations of the armed forces and how this support can be mobilised.

 

The AIV concludes that five political and social factors are mainly responsible for determining the level of public support for the international deployment of the armed forces, namely:

1. legitimacy: the extent to which political acts of those in authority are perceived as justified and correct;

2. interests and values: the objectives to be achieved by the military operation;

3. success: the result or expected result of a military operation;

4. leadership: the display of convincing political leadership in the course of the decision-making process, especially in clearly demonstrating why military action is necessary; and

5. costs: the risk of casualties in particular can undermine public support for military operations.

 

The AIV believes that the negative effect of possible casualties should not be overestimated. Its effect may, for example, be offset if the other four factors are perceived as positive. The AIV therefore abides by its previous position, namely that the public can in principle understand the need for military deployment in high-risk situations. Available research does not provide convincing evidence of the existence of a ‘bodybag syndrome’.

 

The case of the mission to Uruzgan – which was approved by a large majority of the House of Representatives in a vote on 2 February 2006 at a time when there was no majority of public opinion in favour – is one of the considerations leading the AIV to conclude that although public support for a political decision to embark on a mission is admittedly not essential, it is certainly desirable (particularly for high-risk operations). Although governments have some leeway in this area, it is nonetheless limited. Public opinion cannot be ignored indefinitely without paying a political price.

 

The AIV therefore advises the government to make every effort to mobilise the greatest possible public support for each military operation. To this end the government must clearly and openly express its views on the five factors mentioned above, namely legitimacy, interests and values, success, leadership and costs, in relation to its decisions on military operations.

 

By explicitly dealing with the four factors – legitimacy, interests and values, success and costs – in its communication to the public and parliament on a military operation, the government will at the same time better address the fifth factor – leadership.

Public support does not materialise or last spontaneously, but requires leadership.

 

Other relevant aspects of the report

 

• The provision of good care and aftercare to casualties is of great importance. The AIV therefore recommends that consideration should be given to this as a matter of course in decisions on missions (see section II.2).

 

• The AIV sees no reason to abandon the division into the three principal tasks of the armed forces – 1) defending Dutch territory; 2) promoting the international legal order and stability; 3) assisting the civil authorities – or to include counterterrorism as a separate task (see section II.3).

 

• As regards the role of the armed forces in the political, administrative and socioeconomic reconstruction of states, the AIV endorses the position taken by the government in its 2005 policy memorandum on reconstruction, but notes that the tasks of the armed forces and aid agencies should not be confused (see section II.4).

 

• As regards the subject of the armed forces and national security, the AIV notes that it would certainly be logical for the armed forces to play a greater role tot the extent that civil authorities lack sufficient specialist capabilities or the scale of the event exceeds their capabilities. This could involve, for example, action to deal with the consequences of NBC attacks or accidents, as well as in other fields such as the sharing of intelligence, the coastguard, explosives ordnance disposal, use of surveillance drones, et cetera (see section II.6).

 

• In view of the importance of the public debate on the armed forces, the AIV recommends that the function of initiator of the dialogue about society and the armed forces, as reflected in articles in the media, educational activities and conferences, should be reinstated, either at the Ministry of Defence or elsewhere (see section II.7).

 

• To promote the debate on public support for the armed forces the AIV recommends that the existing contacts between civil bodies, such as universities, and military bodies, such as the Netherlands Military Academy (NLDA) and the Behavioural Sciences Division, be expanded and put on a permanent footing (see section II.7).

 

• In this connection the AIV also recommends that the Behavioural Sciences Division’s Monitor Steun en Draagvlak (Public Support Monitor) should be made public from now on. This publication is a quarterly report of the results of the monthly opinion polls conducted for the Ministry of Defence to assess levels of public support for the armed forces. Hitherto this has been an internal document (see section II.7).

Advice request

Request for advice dated 30 January 2006

 

 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs                                                            Ministry of Defence

Postbus 20061                                                                               Postbus 20701

2500 EB  Den Haag                                                                        2500 ES  Den Haag

Tel.: 070 348 6486                                                                          Tel.: 070 318 8188

 

 

Mr F. Korthals Altes

Chairman of the Advisory Council on International Affairs

Postbus 20061

2500 EB Den Haag

 

 

 

Re: Request for advice on “Society and the Armed Forces”

 

Dear Mr Korthals Altes,

 

On 22 November 2005, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister for Development Cooperation, the Minister for European Affairs and the Minister of Defence together submitted the AIV’s work programme for 2006 to the President of the House of Representatives. A theme of the 2006 work programme is “Society and the Armed Forces”, which focuses especially on public support for defence activities.

 

Public support for the armed forces is connected with how society perceives the armed forces and rates their usefulness and performance of their principal tasks. Such tasks include crisis management in remote regions, including those at the upper end of the spectrum of force, counterterrorism and national security, plus emergency assistance (at home and abroad) and reconstruction.

 

Public support is also connected with the necessity to deploy military personnel in dangerous conditions and the willingness of society and politicians to do so. In addition, it is linked to the suspension of compulsory military service and the accompanying development of all-professional armed services – plus the restraint which, for security reasons, is always exercised in providing information.

 

The Government considers it useful to receive advice on how to maintain public support for defence activities. In this light, it seeks the AIV’s opinion on the following:

 

1.       How important do you consider public support for the armed forces to be, and what factors determine this support?

 

2.       To what extent are Dutch elected office holders, civil society organisations, and individual citizens prepared to accept casualties on military missions?

 

3.       Given their increasing interwovenness, do you believe that defence activities should still be divided into three principal tasks? If so, what relative importance should be attached to the performance of each of these tasks?

 

4.       In terms of their usefulness and necessity in society’s eyes, should the armed forces play a greater role in providing national and international emergency aid as well as political, administrative, and socioeconomic reconstruction, especially in countries affected by armed conflicts?

 

5.       The Government favours the deployment of the armed forces anywhere on the spectrum of force. In its advisory report no. 34 of March 2004, entitled “The Netherlands and Crisis Management”, the AIV supported this approach. In the AIV’s view, how can the Government best continue to ensure public support for activities including stabilisation, reconstruction, and deployment at the high end of the spectrum of force?

 

6.       Would a greater role for the armed forces in national security – such as in combating terrorism and dealing with major disasters – be compatible with the public sense of security and its perception of the role of the armed forces?

 

7.       Do your think that Dutch citizens know enough about the armed forces? To what extent, if at all, would more public information about the armed forces increase the public sense of security? How might the public become more closely involved with the armed forces, especially in the case of military missions?

 

As the Government promised the House of Representatives during the debate on the Ministry of Defence’s 2006 budget, the 2003 Budget Day letter is being updated. The update will be carried out in the first half of the year. Since public support for the armed forces plays an important part in shaping the Government’s approach to the armed forces, the Government intends to incorporate the AIV’s advisory report on Society and the Armed Forces into the update. To be able to use the advice effectively, we would like to see it by mid-April 2006 at the latest. If this relatively short timespan makes it necessary, the Council may give priority to this request for advice over other requests or indicate priorities in the questions. Further consultations may take place, as the need arises, with the Ministry of Defence.

 

Yours sincerely,

 

[signed]                                                             [signed]

 

Bernard Bot                                                        Henk Kamp

Minister of Foreign Affairs                                    Minister of Defence

 

Government reactions

Ministry of Defence

 

Postbus 20701

2500 ES  Den Haag

Telephone (070) 318 81 88

Fax (070) 318 78 88

To the President of the House of Representatives

of the States General

Plein 2

2511 CR Den Haag

 

 

The President of the Senate of the States General

Binnenhof 22

2513 AA Den Haag

 

 

Date:                 23 August 2006

Reference:          HDAB2006026322

Subject:             AIV advisory report “Society and the Armed Forces”

 

 

 

Introduction

The legal basis for the armed forces is article 97 of the Constitution. The first paragraph of this article reads: “There shall be armed forces for the defence and protection of the interests of the Kingdom, and in order to maintain and promote the international legal order.” Despite this constitutional basis, the armed forces also need broad public support to perform their tasks well. This support is especially important because service personnel are often deployed in difficult, sometimes life-threatening, circumstances. It is also important because the ability of the armed forces to fulfil their tasks depends on society’s willingness to provide sufficient resources. It follows that maintaining – and, where necessary, strengthening – public support for the military requires our constant attention.

 

On 2 June 2006, the State Secretary and I sent you a letter updating the 2003 Budget Day Letter (“New balance, new developments”). Based in part on this Update Letter, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and I asked the Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) to draft an advisory report on public support for the armed forces. You received this report, entitled “Society and the Armed Forces”, on 4 May 2006 (30300X, no. 93). I very much appreciate the speed with which it was produced. With this letter, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and I will set out the Government’s response to the advisory report.

 

The AIV distinguished between three levels and forms of support for the armed forces:

1.       Public support for the armed forces in general, i.e. the necessity and desirability of having armed forces.

2.       Public support for the various tasks of the armed forces, such as national defence and contributions to international peace and security.

3.       Public support for specific military operations.

As the AIV rightly points out, these three levels of public support for the armed forces are interconnected. Nevertheless, the categorisation is helpful and I shall therefore use it in this response.

 

Support for the armed forces

The AIV concludes that there is strong support in society for the armed forces. Surveys in recent decades show that on average over three-quarters of the Dutch population considers the armed forces a necessity. The end of the Cold War and the suspension of compulsory military service have not altered this view, according to the AIV. The drop in support following the fall of the enclave in Srebrenica proved to be temporary. In fact, the AIV points out that research by the Social and Cultural Planning Office in 2005 showed that the armed forces enjoy an above-average level of support.

 

Obviously, the government is pleased with the armed forces’ fine reputation, which has ensued in part from the efforts of successive governments to build a high-calibre military force. Since the Cold War, our military has been transformed into a well-equipped, rapidly deployable force, which together with our allies can be deployed for operations anywhere on the spectrum of force. Our service personnel embody the professionalism of the armed forces. Dutch servicemen and women conduct themselves honourably and perform their duties intelligently, which earns them respect at home and abroad.

 

The AIV’s positive assessment of public support for the armed forces is no reason to rest on our laurels. The 10-point plan issued by the Christian Democratic Alliance (CDA) in July 2005 also underscores the necessity of permanent vigilance if we are to ensure public support for the armed forces. In this respect, the CDA points to the importance of visibility. Support in society for the military will continue to require our attention in the future.

 

First, successive governments will have to ensure that the Netherlands maintains a modern military force which is able to make an important contribution to peace and security in our country and abroad. The Ministry of Defence is in the final phase of the largest reorganisation in its history. This far-reaching and complex operation has required a great deal from the Ministry’s management and personnel over the past few years. 11,700 jobs have been cut, bases closed and operational capabilities hived off. In the coming months, the Ministry will do its utmost to rebalance the tasks of the armed forces and the resources available. With this new balance, the government hopes to lay a stable foundation for the continuing targeted development of the military’s capabilities in the years to come. In the Update Letter, the government acknowledged that there have been new developments since 2003 and that previously anticipated developments have unfolded with greater intensity than could have been predicted three years ago. In the coming years, the armed forces will face tremendous new challenges. With that in mind, in the letter we set out the following six military-wide development paths for meeting these challenges:

 

1.       Execution of complex operations far from the Netherlands
Experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan clearly demonstrate the extremely high demands placed on the armed forces of western countries. Effective expeditionary action requires more than primary weapons systems alone. It is essential to also reinforce the support capabilities of the armed forces: logistics, intelligence, self-defence, information and command and control.

2.       From island to archipelago (towards an integrated strategy)
Security risks are no longer restricted by geographical boundaries or to particular ministries or agencies and therefore require a broader, more integrated approach and closer cooperation between ministries and agencies. In response, the Ministry of Defence has joined with other parties in a range of national and international partnerships, which will need to be broadened and deepened in the coming months and years.

3.       Increasing cooperation between the Services of the armed forces
The Ministry of Defence will continue increasing cooperation between the Services at the organisational level and enhancing the modular nature of the armed forces.

4.       Intelligence
The importance of having up-to-the-minute intelligence has increased in recent years. In addition, the increasing complexity of operations and the globalisation of deployment are placing higher demands on intelligence gathering. As a consequence of these developments the Ministry’s entire intelligence chain needs to be strengthened.

5.       From technology to information and innovation
The development of networked information systems, referred to internationally as Network Enabled Capabilities or NEC, is essential if we are to ensure interoperability with our allies. The Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations are working together to determine whether the NEC concept has domestic applications as well. NEC generates important social added value for the armed forces because the concept is in line with the government-wide objective of creating a knowledge economy with major innovative capacity.

6.       From jobs to the people who do them
The quality of military and civilian personnel remains an important achievement for the Ministry of Defence, requiring continuous investment.

 

Second, in order to maintain public support for the armed forces we must convey clearly what they stand for. When drafting the Update Letter, we consulted with leading representatives of the business, research and cultural sectors and organised three working conferences. The results of the external discussions were published in Het vizier op Defensie (Focus on Defence), which was sent to the House of Representatives, and are also available on the Ministry of Defence website (www.defensie.nl). It emerged that many people are unsure of the Ministry’s purpose at this point in history. Apparently, the description in the Constitution is insufficient. The government believes it is of great importance that the nature of the armed forces and their importance to society be highlighted in the most appealing way possible. It is our belief that the military’s raison d'être is to defend our democracy in an ever-changing world. In this age of globalisation, distances can be bridged more rapidly and geographical boundaries offer less protection. The consequences are far-reaching for the security of an open country like the Netherlands. In cooperation with our allies, we must step up our efforts to tackle problems before they reach our borders. In addition to defending our territory, another task of growing importance is protecting our citizens and defending society against a range of threats. To that end our armed forces are actively engaged for peace and security at home and abroad, sometimes in the most difficult circumstances. They defend and represent our country’s interests and values. The armed forces are not a ‘necessary evil’; when called upon to do so, they step into the breach.

 

Third, the armed forces must continually prove that they deserve the trust of our citizens and the esteem of our allies and partners. The government is pleased to observe that regard for the military profession has visibly grown in recent years. However, the AIV also points out that abuses within the armed forces have damaged the image of the defence organisation. The government fully concurs with this observation. Service personnel are expected to set a good example by their conduct. The Ministry of Defence must be consistent in taking action to quell such abuses. Last March, in response to a report of sexual harassment on board a Royal Netherlands Navy vessel, the State Secretary for Defence asked an independent commission to investigate the extent of inappropriate behaviour throughout the armed forces and recommend any measures it deemed appropriate (see letter (30 300 X, no. 78) from the State Secretary for Defence dated 21 March 2006).

 

The Ministry of Defence intends to take steps to respond appropriately to the dialogue on society and the armed forces. The corporate communication policy it is currently developing will play an important role in this process. This dovetails with the AIV’s recommendation to ensure that the Ministry’s function as initiator of dialogue about society and the armed forces, as reflected in articles in the media, educational activities and conferences, is reinstated. In response to the AIV’s advisory report, the Ministry plans to organise a symposium this year on the position of the armed forces in society. The government would note that the Ministry of Defence is already very active in this arena. The open days of each branch of the armed forces are attended by hundreds of thousands of visitors every year and the Ministry’s website receives 120,000 hits a month. The annual Veterans’ Day on 29 June, introduced in 2005, is expected to attract considerable attention. The AIV also mentioned the recognition of the role veterans play as a specific point for attention.

 

In accordance with the AIV’s recommendation, the Monitor Steun en Draagvlak (Public Support Monitor) published quarterly by the Ministry’s Behavioural Sciences Division will be accessible to the public from now on. In order to foster debate on support for the armed forces, the AIV recommended expanding the existing contacts between civil institutions, such as universities, and military institutions, such as the Netherlands Military Academy (NLDA) and the Behavioural Sciences Division. The NLDA arose from the merging of the Koninklijk Instituut voor de Marine (Royal Naval College), the Koninklijke Militaire Academie (Royal Military Academy), the Instituut Defensie Leergangen (Netherlands Defence College), the Advanced Defence Management Studies, the Faculty of Military Science and the Netherlands Institute of Military History. Before their integration, these institutions maintained contacts individually with universities, institutions of higher professional education and other civil bodies. In his recently published strategic vision the NLDA commander cited expanding cooperation with the universities and institutions of higher professional education as one of his objectives. The NLDA’s activities in this area include organising conferences on ethics and the armed forces.

 

External interviews were carried out during process of preparing the Update Letter. Several of the interviewees said they envisaged a support role for the Ministry of Defence in tackling social and societal issues. This role would include contributing to minority integration, dealing with problem youths, and strengthening the Dutch knowledge economy and technological innovation. The Ministry will explore the possibilities for enhancing its added value to society in these areas.

 

Support for the principal tasks of the armed forces

The AIV found that support for the principal tasks of the armed forces is strong,* and that there is no reason to assume that support is greater for some tasks than for others. The AIV sees no need to reformulate the three principal tasks. While we expressed the same conclusion in the Update Letter, it was our intention to update and clarify the ambition level for the armed forces, which shapes the principal tasks in operational terms. In doing so, we articulated in more precise terms what the armed forces can do when called to action. This also ties in with the developments described in the Update Letter and to the Naval Study 2005 aimed at improving the Navy’s ability to support land-based operations.

 

Like the AIV, we would emphasise the conclusion set out in the Budget Day Letter that the three principal tasks of the armed forces are growing ever more interconnected. As the significance of the principal tasks changes, it is becoming gradually less important to distinguish between them in terms of execution. Within the armed forces, a distinction is no longer made between resources deployed abroad and those used at home. In principle, all service personnel can be deployed for any of the principal tasks. Furthermore, national deployment has been organised so as not to impede participation in international operations. We would like to explain this in more detail.

 

The first principal task is defending Dutch territory. Since the end of the Cold War, we have had no fear of large-scale conventional attacks. The primary threats to NATO territory are terrorist activity and the expanding missile arsenals of high-risk countries like Iran and North Korea. That terrorism should be considered a threat to our territory is apparent from the NATO decision to invoke article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in response to the attacks of 11 September 2001. Our military contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom therefore fall under the first principal task.

 

The second principal task ­– promoting the international legal order and stability – has risen to prominence since the end of the Cold War. Bringing stability within a framework of integrated security policy requires, and will continue to require, a significant portion of our military resources. Participating in crisis management operations should be regarded as a means of enhancing the security of our own territory and citizens in the broadest sense. We go where the problem is before it comes to us. Both the first and second principal tasks place extremely high demands on the expeditionary capability of our armed forces. They must be able to act rapidly in cooperation with other forces, over large distances and in a wide variety of circumstances.

 

The third principal task – assisting the civil authorities (nationally, but also internationally, e.g. in providing emergency assistance) – has gained importance in recent years. Traditionally, the armed forces have assisted and supported the civil authorities with the resources on hand. They also have regular civil tasks, such as airspace and coastal monitoring. The military police perform important tasks for the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, e.g. at Schiphol Airport. This principal task requires more attention than before due in part to the terrorist threat. Service personnel can be deployed to halt terrorist attacks or limit the impact of an attack on our territory. In that respect, the third principal task is connected to the first. But the armed forces can help the civil authorities in many more ways. Their expertise, skills and resources can be of great importance to civil bodies, such as the police, the fire service and medical services, not only in combating terrorism but also in disaster relief. According to the AIV, the armed forces have an obvious and larger role to play when it comes to specialist capabilities that are insufficiently available, or unavailable, to civil institutions, or when the scope of an event exceeds the capacity of the civil agencies. In my opinion, these views support the measures that the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and I presented to the House of Representatives in our letter of 24 May 2006 entitled “Intensivering Civiel-Militaire Samenwerking” (Intensifying Civil-Military Cooperation) (30 300 X no.106). The government has made extra funding available to implement these measures.

 

The fact that the distinction between the principal tasks is fading does not diminish the significance of that distinction: it is the basis for the deployment of the armed forces.

 

Support for operations

The AIV found that public support for specific military operations cannot be taken for granted. The level of support can vary strongly and is at times considerably weaker than the support for the armed forces as such or for their principal tasks. The AIV confirmed its previous conclusion that, however desirable it may be, public support for a deployment decision is not the deciding factor. Nevertheless, the AIV advises the government to continue its efforts to generate the broadest possible support in society for every military operation, during the decision-making process and the operation. In this respect, the AIV recommends that the government pay special attention to five factors on which public support for international troop deployments depend:

1.       legitimacy: the extent to which political acts of those in authority are perceived as justified and correct;

2.       interests and values: the objectives to be achieved by the military operation;

3.       success: the result or expected result of a military operation;

4.       leadership: the display of credible political leadership in the course of the decision-making process, especially in clearly demonstrating why military action is necessary; and

5.       costs: including the risk of casualties.

The AIV advises the government to devote explicit attention to the factors legitimacy, interests and values, success and costs in its decision-making and communication about operations in order to cultivate the fifth factor: leadership. In this respect, the AIV discussed the decision-making process regarding the Dutch contribution to the NATO-led ISAF 3 mission in South Afghanistan. In its opinion, it is desirable to have strong public support for such hazardous operations. The AIV noted that four of the five factors – legitimacy, interests and values, success and costs – were indeed dealt with in the government’s letter to parliament about the Uruzgan mission (written in compliance with its notification obligation under article 100 of the Constitution). The AIV referred to opinion polls showing that just under 50% of the population was in favour of the mission when the House of Representatives approved it on 2 February 2006. The AIV acknowledged, though, that public support had risen strongly in December and January, and during the consultations with the House of Representatives more people supported the mission than opposed it.

 

We concur with the AIV regarding the importance of having the strongest possible public support for military operations. The distinction the AIV makes between the different factors on which this support depends is helpful. We are of the opinion that these factors are sufficiently incorporated in the points for attention in the Frame of Reference for decision-making for the deployment of military units abroad – and that these points enable the government to give the factors substance. The government would note in this respect that it is difficult to generate public support for a mission before a course of action has been decided on. The phase preceding a decision is marked by intensive diplomatic consultations at both national and international level. Full disclosure is often impossible at this stage, which limits what can be done to boost public support for a mission. These constraints no longer apply once the decision has been taken.

 

In its report, the AIV also addressed the relationship between the risk of casualties and support for military operations, concluding that there is no proof that support decreases as the number of victims increases. Casualty tolerance is primarily a function of other factors (legitimacy, interests and values, success and leadership). The government shares this view. It is the political community’s responsibility to take a cautious approach to deploying troops. In each case, politicians must weigh the risks to servicemen and women against the interests and values at stake and the viability of the mission. Once they decide to participate in a crisis management operation, they will need to generate public support for the mission.

 

The AIV recommends that consideration be given to the provision of good care and aftercare to military casualties as a matter of course in decisions on missions. The government agrees that providing care is very important. The Ministry of Defence is very aware of its responsibilities to its personnel, in particular the troops who are or have been deployed in crisis management operations. To meet these responsibilities, the Ministry has developed an integrated care plan which grants all former and current Defence personnel the right to receive the care they need. The care plan is set out in a letter to the House of Representatives dated 30 March 2006 (Parliamentary Paper 27 925 no. 210). The government would note that part of the facilities and arrangements are related directly to specific missions. For example, during the preparation for a mission, attention is given to coping with stress, medical care is an important part of the military advice given by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the military planning, and every serviceman and woman goes through the standard after-care process after a mission. However, there are also situations in which the link between care/aftercare and specific missions is less direct, for example in recruitment and selection, or in the care for and reintegration of former military personnel forced to leave the service due to permanent disability.

 

The Minister of Defence

 

 

__________________

 *     The 2000 Defence White Paper defines the armed forces’ three principal tasks:

1.  to protect the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, including the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba;

2.  to promote the international legal order and stability;

3.  to assist the civil authorities with enforcement, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, both nationally and internationally.

 

 

 

 

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